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Abstract: What does it mean to ‘give’ the value of a variable in an algebraic
context, and how does giving the value of a variable differ frommerely describing
it? I argue that to answer this question, we need to examine the role that giving the
value of a variable plays in problem-solving practice. I argue that four different
features are required for a statement to count as giving the value of a variable in the
context of solving an elementary algebra problem: the variable must be in the
scope opened by the problem statement; the values given must be in the range of
the variable, which is determined by the problem; the statement giving the values
must represent a complete solution; and it must be in a canonical form. This ac-
count helps us better understand elementary algebra itself, as well as the use of
algebraic tools to analyze phenomena in natural language.
Keywords: algebra, variables and values, mathematical practice, scope, range,
canonical form
1 Algebraic Investigations
I want to discuss an activity I call an ‘algebraic investigation’. In general, an
investigation is the process of answering a question. When you investigate, you
start by understanding a question, and then you take certain steps to find the
answer. In an algebraic investigation, the question is an elementary algebra
problem, and the steps you take are the algebraicmanipulations that lead you to its
solution. For example, consider a simple polynomial equation of the form:
x2 − 6x + 9 = 0 (1)
In a beginning algebra course, an equation like this is typically used to give a
problem or exercise. This equation gives a problem because it describes a certain
number, x, without specifying which number that is. The ‘x’ represents an epistemic
gap in the statement, something unknown which must be found out. The equation
therefore invokes a question: which number x is such that x2 − 6x + 9 = 0? In a
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classroom or textbook, this question might only appear in an abbreviated form, like
“What is x?” or “Find x”, or it might not be given explicitly at all. Nevertheless, the
process of solving this problem begins from an understanding of this question. To
get started in solving theproblem, youneed to understand thatfinding the answer to
this question is your goal.
This goal imposes a structure on the activity of solving the problem. To reach
that goal, you might proceed like this:
(x − 3)(x − 3) = 0 (2)
x − 3 = 0 (3)
x = 3 (4)
These manipulations—factoring, eliminating a duplicate root, and arithmetically
simplifying—are the steps you take to find the answer to the question. They are
appropriate in this context because they bring you closer to that goal. Many other
manipulations are also possible, but unproductive: you could add 7 to both sides of
these equations, for example, but that would only carry you further away from the
solution. When you arrive at the last equation, you have solved the problem. This
equation tells you what you didn’t know at the start, namely, that 3 is the number
which makes Equation (1) true. Thus, you have found the answer to the initial
question, so your investigation concludes.
The main issue I want to address in this essay is: why does the investigation
end exactly here? Why does writing down the Equation (4) count as solving the
problem given with (1)?
It may seem that this question has an obvious answer: this equation solves the
problem because it gives the value of x. In general, one answers questions in
elementary algebra by giving the values of variables. But what does that mean?
Most of us take for granted that we understand what ‘giving’ the value of a variable
means in the context of an algebra problem; but if questioned, we’d find it difficult
to say exactly what counts as doing so. Why does Equation (4) count as giving the
value of x, for example, while (1)–(3) do not? After all, the four equations are truth-
conditionally equivalent, and contain exactly the same information: each is true if,
and only if, the value of x is 3. Yet (4) is the only line in the derivation that counts as
answering the question posed with (1). What confers this special status on (4)?
Myprimary aimhere is to provide a systematic answer to this puzzle.My account
will give some criteria that analgebraic statementmust satisfy for it to count as giving
the value of a variable and concluding an algebraic investigation. It will depend on
the idea that an algebraic investigation is a kind of inquiry, an activity structured by
the goal of finding the answer to an algebraic question. Aswewill see,what counts as
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giving the value of a variable depends strongly on how that initial question is un-
derstood, and how subsequent steps in the investigation are seen in its light.
2 Some Motivations
Why is such an account interesting? What will it help us understand? First and
foremost, the account I offer here will interest philosophers of mathematics,
because it improves our understanding of a fundamental part of mathematical
practice. Elementary algebra is the first place where students encounter the idea
that variables stand for ‘unknowns’ whose values can only be given or specified
later, as the result of further investigation. This idea is so fundamental to modern
mathematics and logic that it is hard to imagine themwithout it. But the idea is far
from an obvious one; historically, it actually took a long time to develop.1 Precisely
because it is now so fundamental to our mathematical practice and education, it is
worthwhile to bring its complex epistemological structure to light.
Elementary algebra is the simplest and clearest place where we find this
structure, but it is hardly the only one. Any place in mathematics where we ask the
question of which things satisfy a certain condition has the same structure. When
we investigate questions like “What is the Galois group of this polynomial?” or
“What are the bounded harmonic functions on the plane?” we go through a pro-
cess similar to an algebraic investigation.2 This process begins with an under-
standing of the question, which asks for ‘unknowns’ satisfying a certain condition.
The condition plays a role similar to a polynomial equation like (1): it describes
certain values without specifying them. The investigation proceeds by searching
for these values, and ends by giving a specification of exactly which values they
are. The search will use different methods than those of elementary algebra, and
the answer will be expressed in different ways, but the basic structure is the same.
Of course, there are other kinds of questions in mathematics, such as yes-no
questions like “Are there functions which are nowhere differentiable but every-
where continuous?” or “Are there any primes between 2256 and 2257?”We can often
investigate whether something is true without asking which things make it true,
and in such cases, the investigation has a different epistemological structure.3
1 For a fascinating history of how this central algebraic idea developed and how it enabled so
much of modern mathematics, (see Derbyshire 2006).
2 Thanks to an anonymous referee and Peter McGrath for these examples.
3 Belnap and Steel (1976) recognize (wisely, I think) a fundamental distinction between which-
questions and whether-questions, because they have different sorts of possible answers, and so
different processes are required to answer them. The questions which give rise to investigations
with the structure I describe here are all which-questions, in their sense.
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Still, for a large class of mathematical questions, elementary algebra serves as a
particularly clear model of how investigations into these questions proceed. My
account of what it means to give the value of a variable in elementary algebra
readily extends to these other cases, so it can help us understand a widespread
phenomenon in the epistemology of mathematics.
Indeed, the account is also of more general interest, because this same epis-
temological structure appears outside of mathematics. Investigations with this
structure are pervasive in both scientific practice and in ordinary life, and algebraic
variables play an important role in our understanding of the language used to carry
them out. Suppose, for example, that I say:
A man walked in.
Or suppose, observing the same scene, you ask:
Who walked in?
The indefinite description “a man” in my statement, as well as the question word
“who” in your question, will typically be analyzed as introducing a variable.4 That’s
because both sentences describe a certain person who remains ‘unknown’: in much
the sameway that Equation (1) describes a numberwithout specifyingwhich number
it is, these sentences tell us that a person walked inwithout specifyingwhich person
itwas.5 A variable is anappropriate choice for representing the semantic contribution
of these expressions because both sentences invite further investigation to find out
who that unknown person is, just like a polynomial equation.
Natural language also contains sentences that we might think of as giving the
values of such variables. If the next statement in the context is
It was George.
Or, more explicitly,
The man who walked in was George.
then what was unknown becomes known. These sentences feel very much like
Equation (4): they specify the person in question, so they seem to give the value of
4 The analysis of indefinites as introducing variables bound by a quantifier traces back to Rus-
sell’s analysis of descriptions (Russell 1905), and has become completely standard; see also the
analysis in (Heim 2002), which treats indefinites as unbound variables. The use of variables to
analyze questionwords also has a long tradition and has become standard (Belnap and Steel 1976;
Groenendijk and Stokhof 1997; Hamblin 1973).
5 The question tells us this by presupposing that someone walked in, rather than by asserting it.
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the variable introduced earlier.6 They conclude the investigations that the earlier
sentences invite. Butwithout a systematic account ofwhat itmeans to give the value
of a variable, we can’t yet fully exploit the analogy with algebra to understand their
internal semantics, or their relationship to expressions like “a man” or “who” in
prior discourse. Relatedly, we might say that someone who hears the above ex-
change “knows who walked in”. An account of what it means to give the value of a
variable is needed to analyze this ascription of knowledge, and to explain the
relationship between knowing who walked in and knowing that Georgewalked in.7
Of course, the same phenomena arise in scientific uses of natural language.
Consider a chemist who says: “A strange compound precipitated out during the
experiment this morning” and later reports: “It was arsenic sulfide.” Or consider an
astronomer who wonders which pair of galaxies she is looking at, and later de-
termines that it was NGC 2207 and IC 2163. In all such cases, an investigator starts
from a question about which unknown thing or thingsmeet a certain condition, and
through investigation comes to know and to say which things those are; and this
process can be looked at as finding out and giving the value of a variable. A sec-
ondary aim of this essay, then, is to provide the foundations which support such
applications of algebraic variables to the analysis of natural and scientific language,
and to the shifts in our knowledge that such language is used to express. Though I
will not saymore about these applications here, I have looked at them inmore detail
elsewhere.8
6 Such sentences are known in linguistics as specificational sentences. When linguists charac-
terize them, they often spontaneously resort to a comparison with equations like (4). Mikkelsen
(2011, pp. 1809–1810) writes, for example, that in specificational sentences, the left side
“introduces a variable”, while the right side “provides the value for that variable”. Similar remarks
appear in much of the linguistics literature on specificational sentences (e.g., Akmajian 1970;
Heycock and Kroch 1999; Higgins 1979). Recently, philosophers have become interested in spec-
ificational sentences in the context of a debate about how to analyze sentences like “The number of
Jupiter’s moons is four” (Brogaard 2007; Felka 2014, 2016; Knowles 2015; Moltmann 2013; Snyder
2017).
7 This relationship has been important in recent discussions about knowledge-wh (Parent 2014).
Themain issue in those discussions is how to understand claims of the form “S knowsQ”, whereQ
is an interrogative formedwith awh-word. Reductionists hold that such claims are true just in case
S knows that p, where p is the (or a) true answer to Q (see e.g. Boër and Lycan 1986; Hintikka 1975;
Stanley and Williamson 2001). A number of authors have recently challenged reductionism,
arguing that knowledge-wh ineliminably involves the question Q (Brogaard 2009; Farkas 2016;
Masto 2010; Schaffer 2007). In one typical kind of case, p answers Q by virtue of having definite
values in the places where Q has variables, so understanding what it means to give the value of a
variable is an important preliminary step toward resolving the debate over reductionism about
knowledge-wh.
8 See Lawrence (2017).
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3 Four Criteria for Concluding an Algebraic
Investigation
Let’s now turn to the details of the account. We have seen that when an equation
like (4) gives the value of a variable, it has a special status: it marks the end of an
algebraic investigation, the point at which the goal is reached and the question is
answered.What confers this special status on (4), in contrast to Equations (1)–(3) in
the derivation above? That is, why doeswriting down this equation, in this context,
have the epistemological significance of concluding the investigation—as the other
lines do not, and as the same equation would not in a different context? This is the
question to be addressed here.
As I have already noted, each line of this derivation is truth-conditionally
equivalent to the others. Thus, to understand why only the final equation counts as
giving the value of x, we need to look beyond its truth conditions. For its truth
conditions are the same as the other equations’, but we need to knowwhat makes it
different: we need to explain why deriving this final equation counts as discovering
the value of x, and therefore as coming to know the answer to the algebraic question,
but deriving the earlier equations does not. What else, then, could explain this
equation’s unique epistemic role?
Here ismy answer, in outline. There are four different features of Equation (4)
which are crucial for it to count as giving the value of x and as answering the
question invoked by (1). These are: that the variable is in the same scope as the
variable introduced by the problem statement; that the value given is in the range
of the variable; that the equation represents a complete answer to the question;
and that the equation is in a canonical form. These are not features of the equation
itself; they are features of how it is used and understood in this particular context.
Each of them is individually necessary for this equation to be understood as
giving the value of x. Together, they provide a reasonably complete account of
why this equation answers the problem, but the earlier equations do not. Let me
describe each in turn.
3.1 Scope
It is easiest to see what I mean by ‘scope’ if we ask: why does the equation x = 3, as
it is used on line (4), give the solution to the problemgivenon line (1), as opposed to
someother problem? The obvious answer is that the equations on these two lines of
the derivation employ the same variable. But what is it for the variable to be ‘the
same’ in these two lines? This is obviously not a purely typographical matter. The
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symbol ‘x’ can be used to express a variable in many different problems. I might
introduce a new problem to you with an equation like
x2 − 4x + 4 = 0 (5)
without causing any confusion. Students of elementary algebra have to learn that
the symbol ‘x’ is being used differently here than in (1), and that its use in (4) is
connectedwith its use in (1) but not in (5). This is what Imean by scope: a variable’s
scope includes just those statements in which its occurrences are understood to be
connected.
In elementary algebra, a variable’s scope thus depends on the problem-
solver’s understanding of her own activity. Its scope extends exactly as far as the
statements belonging to a single algebraic investigation, and no further. This is
because an algebraic variable originates as an ‘unknown’ with the question that
structures the investigation. Understanding a statement containing a variable
requires recognizing it as part of an attempt to answer that question by finding
the variable’s value. A variable’s scope thus opens with a posing of a problem,
using one or more equations; it closes with a statement of its solution, which
gives the value (or values) of that variable; and it includes whatever statements
occur between the problem statement and the solution statement that are part of
the problem-solver’s effort to move from the former to the latter.
There is no sense in asking for the value of a variable apart from some scope or
other. A variable only has a value relative to the question which introduces it. To
say that an equation gives the value of a variable is therefore to connect that
equation with an attempt to answer a particular problem or question.9 It is to place
the use of that equation in the context of some algebraic investigation or other. This
gives us ourfirst criterion: for an equation to count as giving the value of a variable,
9 Thus, in the language used by authors like Schaffer (2007), Masto (2010) and Farkas (2016), I am
proposing an ‘anti-reductionist’ view of the knowledge acquired in an algebraic investigation.
Anti-reductionism is the view that the question plays an essential role in characterizing this
knowledge: the student who derives (4) does not simply come to know that x = 3, but comes to
know it as the answer to the question of which number x is such that x2 − 6x + 9 = 0. Apart from the
context of some such question, it makes no sense to say that someone comes to know ‘that x = 3’.
A key argument for anti-reductionism is the observation that, since the same proposition p can
answer different, non-equivalent questions, knowing that p must be compatible with having
knowledge-wh of one these questions without the others. In the present context, this corresponds
to the observation that deriving an equation that gives the value of a variable only counts as
coming to know the answer to the algebraic question in whose scope it occurs. The student who
derives (4) from (1) knows which number x is such that x2 − 6x + 9 = 0, but not which number x is
such that x3 − 9x2 + 27x = 27, even though x = 3 in both cases.
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the variable in that equation must occur in the same scope as in the problem to
which the equation gives the solution.
3.2 Range
Of course, the problemwhich introduces a variablemust actually have a solution if
its value is to be given. This depends on a feature of how the problem is under-
stood: the variable’s range. Take, for example, the problem given by the following
equation:
x2 + 5x + 6 = 0 (6)
If x is taken to range over the natural numbers in this problem, then it has no
solution, as you can see once it has been factored:
(x + 2)(x + 3) = 0 (7)
The roots of (6) are −2 and −3. They are both negative integers, so they are not
among the natural numbers. Sowhether or not this problemhas solutions depends
on whether x ranges over just the natural numbers, or over some more inclusive
set, like the integers. It is only possible to give a value for x in this case when x is
understood as ranging over some set that includes at least −2 or −3. Different
understandings of the range of a variable thus influencewhether, and how, a value
for that variable can be given. This gives us a second criterion: for an equation to
count as giving the value of a variable, that variable must be understood to have a
certain range, and the value given must fall within that range.
3.3 Completeness
The previous example raises another important point. Many polynomial equa-
tions, unlike (1), have more than one root, at least on some ways of understanding
the range of the variable. For this reason, it is in general too simple to ask under
what conditions a statement gives the value of a variable. When x is understood to
range over the integers in (6), an equation like
x = −2
could be said to give ‘a’ value of x, but not ‘the’ value of x, since no value in that
range uniquely satisfies the equation. For an algebraic statement to count as a
solution statement, it must give at least one value for the problem’s variable. But in
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general, there is a further question as to how many such values must be given for
the end of an algebraic investigation to be attained.
For equations with multiple distinct roots, we need to distinguish among
several possible understandings of the problem in order to answer this question.
Because it hasmultiple roots, an equation like (6) actually underdetermines which
question is being asked. If the question is “What are all the numbers x such that
x2 + 5x + 6 = 0?”, then a complete answer must give both roots. Someone solving
this problem would have to write something like
x = −2 or x = −3 (8)
to completely answer this question and achieve the end of her investigation. On the
other hand, if the question is “What is one number x such that x2 + 5x + 6 = 0?”
then
x = −3 (9)
gives a complete answer to the problem. Even though it does not exhaustively list
the roots of the equation, the problem-solver can stop at this point, since this
equation provides everything the question asks for.
Borrowing some terminology from Belnap and Steel (1976), we can say that
although these two problems are posed with the same polynomial, they make
different requests. A problem’s request determines howmany solutions an answer
should provide, and whether a correct answer should provide an exhaustive list of
them. In general, the answer to the question that initiates an algebraic investiga-
tion is not complete unless it fulfills this request, so what counts as completely
solving a problem depends on how the problem’s request is understood.
This shows that we should distinguish giving a value of a variable from giving
the answer to an algebraic question. Depending on the problem’s request, it may be
necessary to give more than one value for a variable in order to give a complete
answer. The same distinction is also needed when we look at the more general
class of algebra problems given by systems of equations inmultiple variables, such
as the problem given by (10) and (11):
x2 + y2 = 25 (10)
x − y = 1 (11)
Here is one solution to this problem:
x = 4, y = 3 (12)
This solution statement contains two equations as parts, each of which gives a
different value for a different variable. Giving a value for a variable is necessary,
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but not sufficient, for completing an algebraic investigation. A problem-solver only
completes an investigation when she gives an answer that provides as many so-
lutions as requested, each ofwhichmust give values for each of the variables in the
problem.
3.4 Canonical Form
The final criterion concerns which kinds of expressions are suitable for giving the
value of a variable. I call these criteria of canonical form. When an equation is
suitable for giving the value of a variable, it must also be in canonical form. To see
the importance of canonical form, consider again the final two lines from the
derivation in (1)–(4):
x − 3 = 0
x = 3
As we noted earlier, these equations are equivalent. What then is the difference
between them? Why is it that only the second of these equations counts as giving
the value of x, and thereby giving the solution to the problem in (1)?
The point I want to emphasize here is that some standard or other is always
required in a problem-solving practice to distinguish among equations like these.
Part of understanding a problem is grasping the criteria that distinguish those
statements which can be used to give values for the problem’s variables from those
which, though otherwise equivalent, cannot. In the absence of such criteria, we
have no grounds for distinguishing equations that are used to give problems from
those that are used to give solutions, and so no possibility of a problem-solving
activity at all. Thus, for an equation to count as giving a value of a variable, some
such criteria must be in place, and the equation must fulfill them.
What are those criteria? Looking at the two equations above, a natural first
thought is that the second equation is syntactically and arithmetically simpler than
the first. This can’t be thewhole story about canonical form, though, because there
are other pairs of equations in which one equation is no simpler than the other, but
only one counts as giving the value of x. Here are two examples:




At least in the classrooms where I was taught, only the lower equation in each pair
would have counted as a complete solution to a problem, even though it is no
syntactically or arithmetically simpler than the upper one.
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Usually, we can say that for an equation to be in canonical form, the variable
should be arithmetically isolated, and purely numerical expressions should be
fully computed. But even these generalizations are not exceptionless, and apart
from them, whether an expression counts as being in canonical form is a fairly
local matter. Consider, for example, the problem given by
18x = 8




Neither of these equations is ‘more canonical’ than the other in any global sense. A
teacher who assigns this problem as an exercise might accept one equation as a
solution but not the other depending onhis pedagogical purposes. For example, he
might accept the right-hand equation as a complete solution, but the left-hand
equation as only a partial solution, in a lesson emphasizing decimal expansions of
rational numbers. In a lesson emphasizing exact expressions of ratios, or where
calculators are not permitted, the standard might be the other way around.
Criteria of canonical form, then, are inherently local and purpose-relative,
even if there are some general rules that apply inmost problem-solving settings. So
what, if anything, unifies the various standards we might have? Is there any
general account of what it is for an expression to be in canonical form?
Here is my answer: a standard of canonical form determines a distinguished
class of expressions such that, when one of these expressions is used to give the
value of a variable, no further question can be appropriate about which value is
meant. This becomes clearer if we imagine an algebraic investigation formulated
as an explicit question and a series of attempted answers:
Which number x is such that 4x2 − 4x + 1 = 0?
If you were to ask someone this question, it would obviously be unsatisfying to be
told, in reply, that
It is the number x such that 4x2 − 4x + 1 = 0.
even though this answer is in a sense perfectly true. This ‘answer’ merely repeats
the problem; it is unsatisfying because it invites the rejoinder, “But which number
is that? That’s what I wanted to know.” It would only be slightly more satisfying if
the reply was
It is the number x such that (2x − 1)2 = 0.
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Here again, it can be appropriate to ask “Butwhich number is that?”, and insofar as
it is, the respondent has not fully answered the original question.10 But this
question is no longer appropriate if the respondent says:
It is the number x such that x = 12.
A further ‘Which number is that?’ question in this case would indicate a misun-
derstanding on the part of the questioner. Our practices of giving numbers simply
do not allow any further request here; the expression ‘x = 12’makes it as clear which
number ismeant as anyone has any right to demand. This equation, unlike those in
the other answers, is in canonical form. Its being in canonical form just consists in
the fact that no such demand is appropriate.
I am not the first to emphasize the importance of canonical form. In an un-
published lecture, Saul Kripke describes a closely related concept, which he calls a
buck-stopper. For Kripke, a buck-stopper is a term such that “the question ‘Yes, but
which [number is that] andhowdid I knowthis?’ is completely idle, andnoanswer to
it need be given” (Kripke 1992, p. 15). Thus, when an equation is in canonical form in
my sense, the term within it that specifies the variable’s value is a buck-stopper for
Kripke, like ‘12’ in the example just given. Similar concepts appear in discussions by
other authors, too. Kripke cites Ackerman (1978), who calls numerals standard
names for numbers, and contrasts their behavior under propositional attitude verbs
with complex arithmetical terms and descriptions like ‘8 + 3’ or ‘the least perfect
number’. Dummett likewise suggests that a “preferred range of names” is needed to
ground the (Fregean) senses of terms that refer tonumbers andother abstract objects
(Dummett 1981, p. 499). More recently, Heylen (2014) speaks of the Peano numerals
as canonical terms for numbers, and argues that their special status is explained by
the induction schema in Peano arithmetic. These authors all suggest, in different
ways, that a certain subclass of terms fornumbers playa special role inour epistemic
relations to them and our language for reporting those relations.
I agree with these authors that such canonical ways of giving numbers are
crucial for mathematics. What is missing in their discussions, I think, is an
10 Authors like Boër and Lycan (1986) and Aloni (2005) share my intuition here that an unsat-
isfying reply to such a question does not count as an answer even if it is true, and thus that
answerhood depends on contextual features like the purposes of the questioner. A contrary view is
offered by Braun (2006), who distinguishes the notion of answering a question from that of
satisfying the inquirer. On Braun’s view, we should say that these replies answer the question but
are unsatisfying. But as Masto (2010) notes, Braun’s invariantist understanding of the question-
answer relationwon’t help us understand an inquiry like an algebraic investigation as a process of
making progress toward finding an answer, since even a trivial, unsatisfying answer counts as an
answer on Braun’s view.
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awareness of the crucial role of canonical terms in investigations. These discus-
sions have tended to focus on the natural numbers and our numerals for them, and
to explain the special status of these numerals by reference to the fact that they
form a recursively enumerable set. But the felt contrast between canonical and
non-canonical terms is not limited to this (fairly unusual) case. We can still draw
the distinction between canonical and non-canonical terms in algebraic in-
vestigations where the range of a variable is not enumerable: we have both ca-
nonical and non-canonical terms for transcendental numbers like π and e, for
example. We also feel a similar contrast in other problem domains. Consider a
question like: “What is the group of symmetries of a regular tetrahedron?” and the
contrast between answers like ‘S4’ and ‘the symmetric group with 30 subgroups’.
Or consider again a question in ordinary language like “Who walked in?” and the
contrast between replies like ‘George’ and ‘the only person I saw yesterday’. For
any question that asks for a specification of the values satisfying a certain condi-
tion, we can draw a contrast between answers which permit a rejoinder of “But
which one is that?” and answers which don’t, even if we have no way of
enumerating all and only the latter answers.
The special status of these terms has less to do with their enumerability and
more to dowith the epistemological structure of investigations in general. From the
perspective I have offered here, the crucial feature of standards of canonical form is
that they allowus to recognizewhen a process of inquiry has come to an end.When
we start an investigation into a particular question,wedon’t knowwhat the answer
is (if we did, there would be no point in investigating!). But unless we have at least
some idea of what the answer must be like, the investigation could go on forever:
without some way of distinguishing an answer from what is merely a step toward
an answer, we will have noway to recognize an answer whenwe finally find it. It is
true that recursively enumerable sets of terms, like numerals for the natural
numbers, provide us with an especially clear idea of what the answers to many
algebraic investigations should be like. But as I have indicated, our standards of
canonical form may still vary from one problem-solving context to the next. The
important point is that some such standards are always in play during an algebraic
investigation, because it is by understanding and applying them that we recognize
that the problem has been solved, and the investigation is concluded.
4 Conclusions
Here is a summary of the above observations. Algebraic practice is a practice of
investigation, of posing questions and seeking their answers. When we say that an
equation like
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x = 3
‘gives the value of a variable’, we are assigning it a certain role within that practice.
We are saying it is part of a solution statement, which concludes an algebraic
investigation by fulfilling its aim. It forms part of the answer to the “Which
numbers x are such that …?” question that structures the investigation, by spec-
ifying one of the values that this question asks for. This distinguishes it from
equations which state problems, or mark intermediate steps between a problem
and a solution, which do not give a value for the variable and cannot be part of a
solution statement.
In order for an equation to play that role, it must be understood in a certain
way. Its variable must be in the same scope as the variable introduced by the
problem statement, and it must give a value within the range that the variable is
understood to have. To count as giving a value, rather than just describing it, the
equation must satisfy some criteria for being in canonical form, using an expres-
sion for the value which is not subject to a “But which do you mean?” rejoinder by
the standards of the problem-solving practice. When a polynomial used to pose a
problem has more than one root, or contains more than one variable, more than
one such equation might be necessary to solve the problem and complete the
investigation. How many such equations are necessary is a matter of how the
question structuring the investigation is understood: how many variables it in-
troduces, how many solutions it requests, and whether or not it requests an
exhaustive list of solutions.
Through an algebraic investigation, one comes to know which number (or
numbers) make some polynomial equation (or system of equations) true. On the
view I have offered, this knowledge is best characterized in relation to the question
which opens the investigation; what one comes to know depends on how exactly
that question is understood. In this sense, knowing which number x is such that
x2 − 6x + 9 = 0 is different from simply knowing that 32 − 6 ⋅ 3 + 9 = 0. One can
come to know the latter without going through an algebraic investigation—say, by
playing idly with a calculator. But in that case, there is no need to characterize the
knowledge in terms of the question it resolves, and precisely for that reason, there
is no need to describe the acquisition of such knowledge as a process of finding out
the value of a variable. In elementary algebra, a variable is a devicewhich links the
giving of a value back to a question that askswhich values it has.Whenwe describe
someone as knowing which number x is such that x2 − 6x + 9 = 0, or as knowing
that x = 3, we characterize her as knowing something as the answer to a prior
algebraic question. Her knowledge is the outcome of an investigation.
As I indicated at several points, the account I have given is also useful
for understanding other kinds of investigations, including other problems in
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mathematics, as well as investigations in science and everyday life. It makes sense
to look at many different investigations as a process with a structure similar to an
elementary algebra problem: it begins with a question that introduces one or more
variables as ‘unknowns’, and ends by giving the values of these variables, that is,
by specifying what was previously unknown. If we extend the account developed
here to this wider class of cases, many interesting further questions arise. For
example: what does it mean to understand the range of the variable in a question
like “Under what conditions can a planet support life?” How do we recognize the
scope of an investigation into this question, where the statements which belong to
itmight bemade over long distances in space or time, andbymany people?Howdo
we converge on standards of canonical form that help us recognize when the
investigation is completed? The account offered here does not answer these
questions; but part of its interest is that it helps bring them to light.
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